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This  paper  provides  a  framework  for  addressing  the  question  of 
when  transactions  should  be  carried  out  within  a  firm  and  when 
through  the  market.  Following  Grossman  and  Hart,  we  identify  a 
firm with the assets that its owners control. We argue that the crucial 
difference  for party  1 between  owning  a firm (integration)  and con- 
tracting  for  a  service  from  another  party  2  who  owns  this  firm 
(nonintegration)  is that,  under  integration,  party  1 can  selectively 
fire  the  workers  of  the  firm  (including  party  2),  whereas  under 
nonintegration  he can "fire" (i.e., stop dealing  with) only the entire 
firm: the combination  of party 2, the workers, and the firm's assets. 
We use this idea to study how changes  in ownership  affect the incen- 
tives of employees  as well as those  of  owner-managers.  Our frame- 
work is broad enough  to encompass  more general control structures 
than simple  ownership:  for example,  partnerships  and worker and 
consumer  cooperatives  all emerge  as special cases. 
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I.  Introduction 
What is a firm? How do transactions  within a firm differ  from  those 
between  firms? These  questions,  first raised by Coase (1937)  over 50 
years ago,  have  been  the  subject of  much  discussion  by economists, 
but general  answers  at the  level  of  formal  modeling  still have  to be 
provided.  The  purpose  of  this paper  is to provide  a framework  for 
addressing  such questions.  Following  Grossman  and Hart (1986),  we 
identify  a firm with the  assets it possesses  and take the  position  that 
ownership  confers  residual rights of control over the firm's assets: the 
right  to decide  how  these  assets are to be used  except  to the  extent 
that particular  usages  have  been  specified  in an initial contract.  We 
argue  that the  crucial difference  for party  1 between  owning  a firm 
(integration)  and contracting  for a service from  another  party 2 who 
owns this firm (nonintegration)  is that, under  integration,  party 1 can 
selectively fire the workers of the firm (including  party 2) if he dislikes 
their performance,  whereas  under  nonintegration  he can "fire" (i.e., 
stop dealing with) only the entire firm: the combination  of party 2, the 
workers, and the firm's assets. We use this idea in a multiasset,  multi- 
individual  economy  to  study  how  changes  in  ownership  affect  the 
incentives of nonowners  of assets (employees)  as well as the incentives 
of owner-managers. 
Our analysis is consistent  with and builds on the ideas developed  by 
Williamson (1975,  1985) and Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978),  as 
well as Grossman and Hart (1986).'  Williamson and Klein et al. made 
the important  observation  that firms matter when  parties must make 
specific  investments  and,  because  of  the  impossibility  of  writing  de- 
tailed  long-term  contracts,  the  quasi  rents  from  these  investments 
cannot be divided  up appropriately  in advance.  Integration  is seen as 
a way of  reducing  the  opportunistic  behavior  and  holdup  problems 
that can arise in such circumstances.  Grossman and Hart argued  that 
a change  in ownership  brings  costs as well as benefits.  Transferring 
ownership  of an asset from party 2 to party 1 increases  1's freedom  of 
action to use the asset as he or she sees fit and therefore  increases  1's 
share of ex post surplus and ex ante incentive to invest in the relation- 
ship;  but  2's share  of  ex  post  surplus  and  incentive  to  invest  falls. 
Hence concentrating  ownership  in 1's hands will be good to the extent 
that l's investment  decision  is important  relative to 2's, but will be bad 
if the opposite  is the case.  In this way, the costs and benefits  of inte- 
gration can be understood  as two sides of the same coin. 
The  Grossman-Hart  analysis is restrictive in that it views the costs 
and benefits  of integration  solely in terms of  the incentive  effects  on 
1 For recent reviews of this literature,  see 0.  Hart (1989) and Holmstrom  and Tirole 
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top  management.  In  this  paper,  we  allow for  the  possibility that an 
asset is worked on by several people,  some of whom  (employers)  have 
ownership  rights  and  others  of  whom  (employees)  do  not.  A major 
part of our analysis will be concerned  with how employees'  incentives 
change as integration  occurs, that is, as asset ownership  becomes more 
or less concentrated. 
In  addition,  we  specialize  the  meaning  of  residual  control  rights 
relative to Grossman  and  Hart.  We  suppose  that the  sole  right  pos- 
sessed by the owner of an asset is his ability to exclude  others from the 
use of that asset. That  is, the owner of a machine  can decide  who can 
and who  cannot  work on  that machine,  the owner  of  a building  can 
decide  who  can and who cannot  enter  the building,  the owner  of  an 
insurance  company's  client list can decide  who has and who does  not 
have access to the list, and so forth.2 We shall see that control  over a 
physical asset in this sense  can lead indirectly  to control  over human 
assets. For example,  if a group  of workers requires the use of an asset 
to be  productive,  then  the  fact that the  owner,  party  1 say, has the 
power to exclude  some or all of these workers from the asset later on 
(i.e., he can fire them selectively) will cause the workers to act partially 
in  party  l's  interest.  The  reason  is  that  by  doing  so  workers  put 
themselves  in a stronger  bargaining  position  later on with the person 
who determines  whether  they have  access to the asset: party  1. This 
should  be contrasted  with a situation  in which party 1 contracts for a 
service  from  someone  else  who  owns  the  asset;  under  these  condi- 
tions, the asset's workers will tend to act in the other  person's interest 
since it is that person  who is the boss they bargain with in the future. 
Hence,  this view of  the firm as a collection  of  physical assets leads to 
the intuitive conclusion  that a person will have more "control" over an 
asset's workers if he employs  them (i.e., owns the asset they work with) 
than if he has an arm's-length  contract with another  employer  of the 
workers.3 
We shall use the following  model  to formalize  these ideas. We con- 
sider  a situation  in which  agents  take actions  today  that affect  their 
(actual or  perceived)  productivity  or value  tomorrow.  These  actions 
might  represent  an investment  in human  capital, participation  in on- 
2 The  notion  that the boss of a firm can exclude  employees  from access to the firm's 
assets may be found  in Alchian  and  Demsetz  (1972). 
' It should  be emphasized  that the  approach  taken in this paper  (and in Grossman 
and Hart [ 1986]) distinguishes  between ownership  in the sense of possession  of residual 
control  rights  over  assets  and  ownership  in  the  sense  of  entitlement  to  an  asset's 
(verifiable) profit stream. In practice, these rights will often  go together,  but they do not 
have  to. The  property  rights  approach  takes the  point  of  view that the  possession  of 
control  rights is crucial for the integration  decision.  That  is, if firm  1 wants to acquire 
part of firm 2's (verifiable) profit stream, it can always do this by contract. Firm 1 needs 
to integrate  only  if it wants to acquire control  over  firm 2's assets. 1122  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
the-job  training,  or  an  activity that  provides  information  about  the 
agent's characteristics.  For example,  an agent  may learn how to be a 
good  production  line worker,  sales manager,  or corporate  lawyer to- 
morrow  by  learning  certain  skills today  or  simply  by  carrying  out 
those jobs  today.  Or,  by working  hard  or  following  instructions,  an 
agent may signal his type, for example,  that he is able, that his cost of 
effort  is low, or that he is hardworking,  trustworthy, or loyal. We also 
suppose  that  it is costly  for  agents  to  write  detailed  long-term  con- 
tracts that precisely specify current and future actions as a function  of 
every  possible  eventuality  and  that, as a result,  the contracts written 
are incomplete  and  will be subject to renegotiation  later on.  Finally, 
we suppose  that at least some  of the actions taken today "pay off"  in 
the  future  only  if the  agents  have access to particular assets; that is, 
some  skill or  productivity  acquisition  is asset-specific  (as in  Becker 
[1964])  as well  as  possibly  person-specific  (the  asset  specificity  may 
come  from  the fact that the assets have special characteristics or that 
workers have sunk costs to locate near  them). 
These  assumptions  have  the  following  implications.  First, the  in- 
completeness  of contracts means that the future return on an individ- 
ual's current  action will depend  on his "marketability" or bargaining 
position  tomorrow  in ways that cannot  be controlled  via the original 
contract.  Second,  the  existence  of  asset  specificity  means  that  an 
agent's  marketability  or  bargaining  position  will  depend  on  which 
assets he has access to and hence  will be sensitive  to the allocation  of 
asset ownership.  As a result,  an agent's  actions will depend  not only 
on whether  he owns a particular asset but, in the event  that he does 
not own it, on who does.  (In this paper,  all ex ante actions by agents 
will involve  [actual or  perceived]  changes  in human capital.  Physical 
assets will be supposed  to be already in place; the only question  is who 
owns them.) 
This  last point,  plus  some  of  the  paper's other  ideas,  can be illus- 
trated by an example.  Suppose  that two workers  1 and 2, in conjunc- 
tion with some  specific  asset, can provide  a service to consumer  3 at 
date 1. To aid the exposition  we shall imagine that the asset is a luxury 
yacht, worker  1 is a chef,  worker 2 is the skipper,  the service is gour- 
met  seafare,  and  consumer  3 is a very  important  customer,  for  ex- 
ample, a tycoon who entertains  frequently.  For this service to be use- 
ful, the chef  must, at cost  100 to himself,  take an asset-specific action 
at date 0, for example,  acquire a skill (the skill might  be preparation 
of a particular cuisine).  Such a skill would  typically be partially trans- 
ferable,  and  the  argument  below  generalizes  to this case.  However, 
for simplicity, we suppose  that it is not transferable at all (there are no 
other  yachts cruising  nearby).  Suppose  also that  (i) the  value  of  the 
service to the tycoon is 240 and, moreover,  no other consumer  values PROPERTY  RIGHTS  1123 
the service at all (only the tycoon can afford to fly to these waters); and 
that (ii) there are many substitutes  for the skipper's skills at date  1, in 
the  sense  that  the  chef  and  tycoon  can  easily  go  to  the  date  1 spot 
market and replace the skipper if necessary. Suppose  in addition that 
transaction costs prevent  the writing of any long-term  contract at date 
0 and that the discount  rate is zero. 
We have set things  up  so that it is efficient  for the chef  to acquire 
the skill at date  0 (the cost of the action,  100, is less than the benefit, 
240).  However,  if  the  skipper  owns  the  yacht,  the  chef  will not  act. 
The  reason  is that,  looking  ahead  to date  1, the  chef  will recognize 
that in order  to realize  the  gains  from  his date  0 action he needs  to 
reach agreement  with the skipper and the tycoon: the skipper because 
the  chef  needs  access  to  the  asset  the  skipper  owns  and  the  tycoon 
because without  the tycoon's cooperation  the service is useless.  If the 
date  1 gains are split three  ways (as a symmetric  bargaining  solution 
predicts),  this  means  that  the  chef  will receive  a return  of  1/3(240), 
which does  not cover  the initial cost of  100. 
In  contrast,  if  the  tycoon  owns  the  yacht,  the  chef  will act.  The 
reason  is that in this case the chef  needs  the cooperation  only of  the 
tycoon  at date  1 to  realize  the  gain  from  his  investment  (since  the 
skipper can be replaced).  If there is a two-way split (again as predicted 
by a symmetric  bargaining  solution),  the  chef's  return  will now  be 
1/2(240) >  100. 
This  example  captures  the idea that the chef  is more likely to take 
an action  specific  to  the  tycoon  (in the  sense  that  the  tycoon  is the 
direct beneficiary of this action)-or,  to put it another  way, act in the 
tycoon's interest-if  the tycoon is his boss than if the skipper is. (The 
tycoon is his boss in the sense  that the tycoon owns the asset the chef 
works with.) 
Notice  that the chef  would  also be motivated  to act if he owned  the 
asset, since this again allows him to cut the skipper out of the bargain- 
ing and receive  1/2(240). In other words, ownership  by either the chef 
or the  tycoon  leads  to an efficient  outcome.  Suppose,  however,  that 
we modify  the example  so that the skipper also has a date 0 action to 
take; for example,  at cost 100 the skipper can increase the value to the 
tycoon  of  the  service  by another  240  (so that the  total value  rises to 
480;  maybe he learns the history of the local islands to plan a better 
itinerary). Then  an analogous  argument  to the one given above shows 
that the skipper will be induced  to take this action if either  he or the 
tycoon owns the asset, but not if the chef does. We are thus led to the 
conclusion  that,  when  both  the  chef  and  the  skipper  take  actions 
specific to the tycoon, it is strictly better that the tycoon owns the yacht 
than that either  the chef  or the skipper does.  We see then that it may 
be efficient  to give ownership  of  assets to agents  who are indispens- 1124  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
able even  though  they may not make important  investment  or effort 
decisions. 
We can  further  modify  this example  to illustrate  another  conclu- 
sion of  the  analysis: assets that are highly  complementary  should  be 
owned  together.  Suppose  that the  chef  and  skipper's actions  are no 
longer  specific to the tycoon  (i.e., other customers  can use the yacht as 
well), but now allow the tycoon also to take an action (the action might 
be to  decide  how  much  entertaining  to  arrange  during  the  coming 
year).  Continue  to  assume  that  the  benefit  of  each  agent's  action  is 
240,  and  denote  agent  i's costs  by  ci (so  if  all three  agents  act,  the 
benefit  of  the  service  to  the  tycoon  is 720).  Suppose  that  the  yacht 
consists of two pieces,  the galley and the hull, say. Neither  piece  is of 
any use  without  the  other.  Would  it ever  be optimal  for  the  chef  to 
own the galley and  the skipper  to own the hull? 
The  answer is no. Under  separate ownership,  the conditions  for the 
chef,  skipper,  and  tycoon  to act are  1/2(240) >  cl,  1/2(240) >  c2, and 
1/3(240) >  C3,  respectively,  since the chef  and skipper  know that each 
must  reach agreement  with the  other  one  in order  to gain  access to 
the  entire  yacht  and  get  the  240  return  on  their  individual  actions, 
and  the  tycoon  knows  that he  must  reach  agreement  with both  the 
chef  and the skipper  to get the 240  return on his action.  It would  be 
better to give the entire  yacht to either  the chef  or the skipper.  Con- 
sider  giving  the  chef  the  hull  as well as the  galley.  Then  the  chef's 
incentive to act rises: he now acts as long as 240 >  cl (he can realize the 
240  without  bargaining  with either  the  skipper  or the  tycoon;  recall 
that the  chef's  action  is no  longer  specific  to the  tycoon).  The  skip- 
per's incentive  is unaffected  since, when  the skipper owned  the hull, 
he  had  to  reach  agreement  with  the  chef  (who  owned  the  galley) 
anyway: the skipper acts as long as 1/2(240)  >  c2. The  interesting  effect 
is on the tycoon.  Now  he will have to reach agreement  only with the 
chef,  as opposed  to the chef and the skipper, and so will act as long as 
1/2(240)  >  C3.  Clearly giving both pieces of the asset to one  agent  (the 
chef  in this case) leads  to fewer  holdups  and  greater  efficiency. 
This  example-even  though  it is very stylized-contains  a number 
of  the  main  ingredients  of  the  model  presented  in  the  paper.  We 
believe  that it throws  light  on  why  it sometimes  pays a firm  (repre- 
sented by the tycoon) to produce  services in-house,  and other times to 
contract outside  through  the  market. 
In the example  above, the bargaining  problem at date 1 is relatively 
simple:  there  are only three  agents,  and a coalition  can obtain either 
all the  surplus  from  some  agent's  action  or none.  In  general,  more 
complicated  situations  will arise in which  partial returns  can be real- 
ized by subcoalitions  of  the  grand  coalition.  In the  model  presented 
below, we take a cooperative  rather than a noncooperative  approach PROPERTY  RIGHTS  1125 
to this bargaining  problem,  adopting  the  Shapley  value as our  solu- 
tion concept.  The  main ideas of the paper hold true under  a number 
of other  divisions  of  the surplus,  however;  we discuss the robustness 
of our results in note  23 and in the Conclusion  (Sec. V). 
The  paper is organized  as follows. The  formal model  and our gen- 
eral results are laid out in Sections II and III. In Section IV, we apply 
and  develop  these  results  in  some  special  cases.  Section  V contains 
concluding  remarks. Appendix  A includes  a number of the proofs of 
the propositions,  while Appendix  B briefly describes an extension  of 
the basic model of human  capital investment  to learning by doing and 
signaling  activities. 
II.  The  Model 
We shall consider  a part of the economy  comprising  a set S of I risk- 
neutral individuals or agents i =  1, . . . , I and a set A of N assets (a,, . . ., 
an,  .  . .,  aN).  There  are  two  periods,  dates  0  and  1. All costs  and 
benefits  are measured  in date  1 dollars. 
At date 0, each agent i takes an action x.  At date  1, production  and 
trade occur.  The  action x, affects  the agent's productivity  or value at 
date  1. As explained  in the Introduction,  this action might represent 
an investment  in human  capital, on-the-job  training, or participation 
in an activity that increases  perceived  rather than actual productivity 
in the future. 
For ease  of  exposition  we  shall  adopt  the  first interpretation:  we 
take x, to  be  a  pure  investment  in  human  capital.  In  Appendix  B, 
however, we discuss how the analysis can be extended  to include some 
of  the  other  interpretations.  As a further  simplification,  we confine 
attention  to  the  case  in  which  an  agent  chooses  only  how  much  to 
invest  (or  under  the  other  interpretations  what  level  of  service  to 
provide). That  is, we suppose  that x, is a scalar lying in [0,  J, where x, 
-  0. Additional  issues  arise if an agent  can also choose  what type of 
investment  to make  (or type of  service  to provide);  we discuss  these 
briefly in the Conclusion. 
Denote  the cost to agent i of action xi by C(xi). We make the follow- 
ing assumption. 
ASSUMPTION  1.  Ci(xi)  :  0 and C(0)  =  0. Ci is twice differentiable. 
If x-i  >  0, then C (xi) >  0 and C'(xi)  >  0 for x, E (0, 5c),  with limxo  C(x1) 
-  0 and limbo  C (x)  =  oc. 
As discussed in the Introduction,  we adopt the incomplete  contract- 
ing perspective  of  Grossman and  Hart (1986).  First, we suppose  that 
the  investment  decisions  xi are  too  complicated  to be  specified  in a 
date 0 contract. Hence  these variables are chosen noncooperatively  by 
the agents  at date  0. Second,  the future  is sufficiently  uncertain  and 11  226  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
transaction costs sufficiently  great that plans about date  1 production 
and trade also cannot  be included  in a date 0 contract.4 Hence  a new 
contract must be written to consummate  the gains from trade at date 
1. Such a contract is supposed  to be feasible since once the uncertainty 
is resolved  at date  1, contingent  statements  are no longer  required.5 
Third,  although  an agent  i's investment  xi is complex,  we assume that 
by date  1 it is observable  to the other agents with whom he deals, and 
hence  the  date  1 contract  is  negotiated  under  symmetric  informa- 
tion.  Finally, we rule out profit-sharing  agreements  at date 0: agree- 
ments that share date  0 investment  costs or date  1 revenues.7 
The  implication of these various assumptions  is that the gains from 
trade at date 1 will be determined  according to a multiperson  bargain- 
ing  process  conducted  under  symmetric  information.  We  take  a 
cooperative  approach  to this bargaining  problem,  adopting  the Shap- 
ley value as our solution  concept.  In order to apply this, we first need 
to specify the gains from trade that various coalitions S of agents can 
achieve by themselves. 
Let x =  (xi, . . . , x1). Consider  a coalition S of agents who control a 
subset A of the assets at date  1. We shall suppose  that the absence of a 
date  0 contract  means  that this coalition  can use the assets in A as it 
likes; in particular,  it can exclude  all agents  outside  S from  access to 
them.  We  also  suppose  that  if  the  coalition  S  forms  at  date  1,  it 
chooses  an  efficient  ex  post  allocation  (as noted,  a contract  to  this 
effect  is feasible  at date  1). Such  an allocation  may be complex;  for 
example,  agents  i and j  may  have  to work with asset a,, and  sell the 
item they produce  to agent  k, who works on it some  more and sells it 
to agent  1. We do  not need  to specify  the details of this allocation.  It 
4 To  do this would  require  numerous  contingent  statements  of the  following  form: 
Agent  1 must provide  agent  2 with service s (described  in detail) in state of the world t 
(described in detail); this would be prohibitively  expensive.  Note that there is no incon- 
sistency in assuming,  on the one  hand, that date 0 contingent  statements are infeasible 
and, on the other  hand,  that agents  have perfect  foresight  about the consequences  of' 
this  lack of  feasibility  (see  Grossman  and  Hart  1986);  we shall be  making  the  latter 
assumption  in what follows. 
' For notational  simplicity, we choose  not to model  the ex ante uncertainty explicitly; 
it will be clear that none  of our analysis would be affected  were we to replace objective 
functions  by their expectations. 
6  That  is, the xi are observable  even  though  they are not verifiable. 
7  Such  agreements  will be  useless  if  (i) date  0 investment  costs are  in the  form  of' 
effort  and  training  costs  that  are  unverifiable  and  (ii)  date  1  revenues  are  also 
unverifiable;  e.g.,  they represents  "perks" or can be diverted  so that they do not show 
up in the accounts.  In fact, even  if date  1 revenues  are verifiable, profit-sharing  agree- 
ments are likely to be of limited value if agents can threaten  not to trade (or to trade an 
unsuitable  service)  at  date  1. (Recall  that  the  date  0  agreement  cannot  specify  the 
precise nature of date  1 trade.)  In this case the date  1 gains from trade are likely to be 
determined  by ex post bargaining,  regardless of any date 0 agreement.  A similar line of 
argument  suggests  a  limited  role  for  revelation  mechanisms,  also  ruled  out  in  this 
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will be enough  to keep  track of the  maximum  (dollar) value that the 
coalition can generate  in this way: we represent  it by v(S, A Ix), where 
we  suppose  that  each  agent's  costs  and  benefits  are  measured  in 
money  terms.8 
In coalition  S, agent  i's marginal  return  on investment  is given by 
a  v(S, AIx)  v'(S,AIx), 
say. For each  i, S, A, and x we make the following  assumptions. 
ASSUMPTION  2.  v(S, AIx)  2  0 and  v(0,  AIx)  =  0, where  0  is the 
empty  set.  v(S, A Ix) is twice differentiable  in x. If x, >  0, then  v'(S, 
AI  x)  -  0 for x, E  (0, i,).  v(S, AI  x) is concave  in x. 
ASSUMPTION  3.  v'(S, A  Ix)  =  0 if i 5! S. 
ASSUMPTION  4.  (alax,)v'(S, AIx) '  0 for all]  #  i. 
ASSUMPTION  5.  For all subsets  S'  C  S, A'  C A, v(S, AIx)  v(S', 
A'  Ix) +  v(S\S',  A\A' I  x). 
ASSUMPTION  6.  For all subsets S'  C S, A'  C A, v'(S, AIx) v?(S', 
A' lx). 
Assumption  3 says that an agent's marginal investment  affects only 
the value of coalitions  of which he is a member.  It captures  the idea 
that an agent's investment  enhances  his own productivity rather than 
that of  any asset he  works with (it is a human  capital, rather than a 
physical capital, investment).  Assumption  4 says that investments  are 
complementary  at the  margin.  Assumption  5  is a natural  superad- 
ditivity assumption:  a coalition could always divide if the values of the 
partition added  up to more than the value of the whole. Assumption 
6  is  stronger  than  the  others:  it  says  that  the  marginal  return  on 
investment  increases  with  the  number  of  other  agents  and  assets in 
the coalition; in conjunction  with assumption  5, this means that mar- 
ginal and total values are positively correlated.  We discuss assumption 
6 further  in the Conclusion. 
Note  that in writing the value of the coalition S as v(S, A Ix), we are 
allowing for the possibility that S recruits additional  members for the 
coalition from outside  the agents S\S;  for example,  S could hire from 
the date  1 spot labor market. Such new members will typically be less 
productive  than  the  agents  S\S  whom  they are replacing-they  will 
not have acquired  the relevant  asset-specific  or person-specific  skills, 
or come with the appropriate  assets-and  it is for this reason that we 
expect  strict superadditivity  to  hold:  v(L, A Ix) >  v(S, AIx)  +  v(S\S, 
A\A Ix). 
Superadditivity  implies  that the  maximum  total value  at date  1 is 
8  Note  that  there  is  no  contradiction  in  assuming  that  costs  and  benefits  are 
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given by v(S, A Ix)  V(x), say. The  first-best overall social surplus  is 
then 
maximum  W(x)  V(x) -  E  C,(x-). 
X  z=1 
Let the maximum  be attained at x =  x*. By assumptions  1 and 2, x* is 
unique  and is characterized  by the first-order  conditions 
a  __-V' 
V(x)  =  vz(0,AIx*)  =  C'(x*)  for alli.  (1) 
We shall be interested  in a noncooperative  situation in which agent i 
chooses  xi at date  0, anticipating  that at date  1 the value  V(x) will be 
divided  among  the  I  agents  according  to  their  Shapley  values.9  In 
order  to  compute  each  agent's  payoff,  we  first need  to  know  who 
controls which assets. 
A.  The Control Structure 
We represent  the  ownership  and  control  structure  by a mapping  a 
from the set of subsets of S to the set of subsets of A, where a(S) is the 
subset of the assets {a,,  .  .  ,  aN} that the coalition  S controls  at date  1. 
For  any  partition  S  U  (S\S)  of  the  agents  S,  each  of  the  assets  is 
controlled  by at most one  of the subsets S, (S\S).  Hence, 
oa(S)  n OPUS)  = 0.  (2) 
Also, the assets controlled  by any subset S' of a coalition S must also be 
controlled  by the whole  coalition: 
t(S') C at(S).  (3) 
Note  that it follows  trivially from  (2) and  (3) that a(0)  =  0. 
DEFINITION.  A (deterministic)  control  structure  is a mapping  a  from 
the set of subsets of S to the set of subsets of A satisfying  (2) and (3). 
Examples  of  control  structures  include  the case in which one  per- 
son i owns some asset a,  (i.e., a,  E a(S)  X  i E S) or person i has a share 
(or vote)  o,(i)  in asset a,  and  majority rule applies  (i.e., a,  E ax(S)  Q 
res ogn(i) >  .5).  Other  arrangements  are  possible,  however.  In  the 
next section,  we shall want to consider  stochastic  control  structures.  A 
stochastic  control  structure  is  simply  a  random  mapping  a,  whose 
'See  Shapley  (1953).  For  a  recent  summary  of  the  Shapley  value  literature  and 
further  references,  see  S.  Hart  (1987).  See  also  the  volume  edited  by  Roth  (1988). 
For examples  of applications  of  the  Shapley  value,  see Aumann  and  Kurz (1977)  and 
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realization a  is a deterministic  control  structure (e.g., each individual 
could be the sole owner  of  asset an  with probability  III).` 
Given  a (deterministic)  control  structure  a,  the  date  1 value  of  a 
coalition  S is v(S, or(S) x). As noted  above,  we suppose  that agent  i's 
share of  V(x) is given  by his Shapley  value 
B-(tc|x)  >  p(S)[v(S, a(S)Ix)  -v(S\{i},  a(S\{i})Ix)],  (4) 
where 
p(S)  =  (s -  1)(  -)! 
and s  =  IS  I,  the number  of  agents  in S. In words,  the Shapley value 
gives agent i his expected  contribution  to a coalition, where the expec- 
tation is taken over all coalitions  to which i might belong.  In particu- 
lar, we can imagine  that the agents S are ordered  randomly, with each 
ordering  being  equally  likely.  If  agent  i is placed  sth from  the  end, 
followed  by the other  members  of coalition S, we say that i belongs  to 
coalition S (this happens  with probability p(S)); agent  i's contribution 
to the coalition  is then  given by the difference  [v(S, o(S) Ix) -  v(S\fi}, 
4(S\{i}) x)], and  the  Shapley  value  is simply  the  expectation  of  this 
over all random  orderings.  Note  that saying that i belongs  to a partic- 
ular coalition  is a manner  of  speaking;  the  statement  should  not be 
taken literally since  the  Shapley  value  is predicated  on the  idea that 
the grand  coalition  S forms  and distributes  surplus  efficiently." 
10 In principle,  the  date  0 contract  could  make  the  control  structure  a function  of 
prearranged  date  1 payments.  An example  of such a control structure is a secured debt 
contract, in which a debtor can "buy" control of an asset (the collateral) from a creditor 
at a prearranged  price (the debt level); see Hart and Moore (1989). Such option-to-own 
contracts are important  when  parties are wealth-constrained,  and these contracts might 
also play a role in the  present  model  (in which wealth constraints  have been  assumed 
away). However,  since we believe that our results would in essence be unchanged  by the 
presence  of option-to-own  contracts,  for simplicity we rule them  out. 
l l We should  mention  that our  results generalize  to divisions  of  surplus other  than 
the Shapley value (see n. 23). Note  that the assumption  that there is costless bargaining 
at date  1 leading  to an ex  post efficient  allocation  is itself very strong.  We discuss this 
assumption  further  in Sec. V. 
In app. A of Hart and Moore  (1988),  we give a brief noncooperative  justification  for 
the use of the Shapley value. The  multistage  game we construct involves a sequence  of 
take-it-or-leave-it contracts.  First (at stage 0 of the game),  the I agents are lined up in a 
random order: jlj  .  .  ..j,  say. Then  at stage  1 agents,  makes an offer  to agent j2. The 
offer  is in the form of a contract forj2  to sign. No restrictions are placed on the type of 
contract that can be offered:  among  other  things,  the contract may specify what offer 
agent j2 has to make to agent j3 at stage  2. Once  the offer  has been  made,  it is either 
accepted  (signed)  by agents2  or  rejected.  In either  event  the  game  then  moves  on  to 
stage  2, at which  point  agent j2  makes  an offer  (a contract)  to agent j3.  This  process 
continues  until the (I -  I)th stage, when agents1  1 makes an offer to agents1. Finally, at 
stage  I  of  the  game,  production  and  trade  are  carried  out  according  to  the  agreed 1130  JOURNAL  OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
At  date  0,  agent  i chooses  xi to  maximize  Bi(oxtx) -  Ci(xi). From 
assumptions  1-3,  the Nash equilibrium x =  xe(ox), say, is characterized 
by the first-order  conditions 
axi  Bi(oIX)  X  =  I  p(S)Vi[s,  t(s)Ixe(aX)] 
Sj1C=S 
~~~~~~~(5) 
=  CI(xi(o))  for all i. 
From assumption  6 and condition  (3), we know that the left-hand  side 
of  (5) is less than or equal  to 
Z, p(S)v(A  ,I  Xe(4t))  =  idS Al  Xe(-)) 
P(1)  xa  v,-xc)  V(x)xxot 
Comparing  (1) and (5), then,for  a given x-i  =  (xI,...  *,  xi-  , xi+ 1 *...  * 
x1), we see that agent  i's private marginal return on investment  is less 
than the socially efficient  level. In proposition  1 we show that assump- 
tions 1-4  together  imply that in fact the entire vector xe(cx)  will be less 
than  the  first-best x*.  Moreover,  any  change  in control  structure  (x 
that increases each agent's private marginal return on investment  will 
unambiguously  improve  welfare. 
PROPOSITION  1.  For any control  structure (X,  there  is underinvest- 
ment: the unique  Nash equilibrium  xe(ox)  satisfies xe(ot)  < x* for each i. 
Moreover,  if the  control  structure  (x changes  to a,  say, so that every 
agent's marginal  return  on investment  increases,  that is, if for each i 
ax  B (tIx)  a  B (o|x)  for all x, 
then  equilibrium  investment  increases,  Xe(&)  '  xe(cx), and  welfare  in- 
creases,  W(xe(Q)) 2  W(Xe(cX)). 
Proof.  See Appendix  A. 
The  underinvestment  occurs, of course,  because  of an externality: 
when agent  i invests more,  some  of his increased  productivity will be 
dissipated in bargaining  at date  1. In fact, it can be seen from (5) that 
he will receive the full marginal return from his investment  only if he 
is first in the random  ordering  of the agents S at date  1;  12 in all other 
cases, some  of  the benefits  will flow to other  agents. 13 
contracts.  We show  that  in  any  (subgame  perfect)  equilibrium  of  this  game,  agents 
receives his Shapley value. For an alternative noncooperative  justification for the use of 
the Shapley  value,  see  Gul (1989). 
12  The  reason  is  that  from  assumption  6  and  condition  (3),  we  know  that  v'(S, 
a(S)Ixe(a))  is greatest  when  S  =  S. 
13  In Grossman  and  Hart  (1986),  overinvestment,  as well as underinvestment,  is a 
possibility because assumption  6 does  not hold in that paper.  For more on the implica- 
tions of violations  in assumption  6, see Sec.  V. 
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We shall take the point of view that efficient  trading at date 0 leads 
to a control structure (x  that maximizes  W(xe(ox)).  That is, if the initial (x 
does  not maximize  W(xe(cx)),  someone  will propose  a new (x and a set 
of  side  payments  such  that everyone  is better  off  (in this paper,  the 
equilibrium  division  of surplus  at date 0 will be unimportant).  In the 
next  section,  we  shall  investigate  the  control  structures  (x that max- 
imize W(xe(ox)).  Then  in Section  IV, we shall apply our general  results 
to some special cases in order to understand  better what factors deter- 
mine  the boundaries  of  a firm.'4 
Before  we proceed,  though,  some  simplification  in notation  is use- 
ful at this point.  Rather  than  carry the  last argument  x of  the  func- 
tions  B-(otx),  v(S,  Ajx),  and  v'(S,  Ajx)  throughout  the  rest  of  the 
paper,  we  shall drop  it and  write simply B (ox), v(S, A), and  v'(S, A). 
Also, we define  the  function  Bt(ot)  by 
B'(ot)  a  Bi(oxtx), 
where here and throughout  the paper we use the equivalence  sign (-) 
to denote  "for all x." 
III.  General  Results 
Our aim in the following  propositions  is to give a partial characteriza- 
tion of an optimal control structure cx:  one that will provide the agents 
with the second-best  incentives  to invest at date 0.15 Of course, if there 
are no  investments,  then  the  control  structure  will be unimportant; 
this follows  from  our  assumption  that there  is costless bargaining  at 
date  1, leading  to ex post efficiency. 
PROPOSITION  2.  If  only  one  agent  i has  an  investment,  then  he 
should  own all the assets; that is, for any coalition  S, an  E cx(S)  if and 
only if i E S. 
Proof.  If only agent  i has an investment,  then we want to choose  a 
control structure cx  that maximizes  his marginal return on investment: 
However,  it appears  from  Milgrom  and  Roberts's (in press)  results on  supermodular 
functions  that this could  be relaxed. 
14  Note  that  we  assume  that  a control  structure  agreed  on  by  the  parties  can  be 
enforced.  In  particular,  we  rule  out  secret  asset  transfers  between  the  agents.  For 
example,  if agents  1, 2, and 3 agree that agent  1 should  own asset a, we do not consider 
the possibility that agent 2 may buy the asset secretly from agent  1, with agent 3 finding 
out about this only after  he  makes his investment  decision. 
15  Note  that many of the propositions  are stated in the form that a control structure 
should have a certain property.  This should be understood  to mean that, in general, the 
property  will be true  of  at least one  (but not  necessarily  all) of  the  a's that maximize 
welfare. Typically,  though,  the optimal  control  structure  will be unique,  in which case 
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B'(t)  =  >  p(S)vz(S, ox(S)). 
SiZES 
From assumption  6, this will be maximized  by putting (x(S) = A for all 
S containing  i. Q.E.D. 
The  idea is simple.  The  best way to induce  the agent  to invest is to 
give  him  use  of  all the  assets,  no  matter  to which  coalition  he  may 
belong,  for then he will have the greatest marginal incentive  to invest 
to improve  his bargaining  position  at date  1. That  is, by giving  him 
control  over  all the assets, the classic holdup  problem  can be at least 
partially alleviated. 
PROPOSITION  3.  Take  any  coalition  of  agents.  Then  each  asset 
should  be controlled  by either  the coalition  or its complement. 
Proof.  Suppose  that  an  ?  of(S) U  cx(oj\S) for  some  asset  an  and 
coalition S. Then  consider  a new control  structure (x that is the same 
as (x except  that  S  and  all  supersets  S ?  of  S  now  control  an.  It  is 
straightforward  to confirm  that  a  satisfies requirements  (2) and  (3). 
(Since (X  satisfies [3], we know that a,  9  cxS\S +) for all supersets  S+, 
and hence  & does  not violate  [2].) 
The  change  B'(&o)  -  Bt(ot) in  marginal  return  on  investment  for 
some  agent  i in S will be 
>3  p(S+)[vz(S+,  ot(S+) U {an}) -  v,(S+,  Ot(S+))], 
s+lscs+ 
which is nonnegative  by assumption  6. For no agent will the change  in 
marginal  return  be  negative.  From  proposition  1,  welfare  will  be 
higher  under  the  new control  structure  & than under  (x. Q.E.D. 
Again,  the idea is simple.  At the margin,  an agent  needs  to be in a 
strong bargaining  position  at date  1 if he is to be induced  to invest at 
date 0. This  means  giving control of as many assets as possible to the 
coalitions  to  which  he  might  belong.  It is therefore  wasteful  not  to 
give control  of  an asset an  to either  S or S\S. 
Proposition  3 is a useful  simplifying  result.  In  particular,  we  can 
rule  out  control  structures  in  which  more  than  one  agent  has  veto 
power  over an asset, that is, in which no coalition can control the asset 
unless  all those  agents  with  veto  power  belong  to  the  coalition.  In 
other  words,  we can rule out certain  types of joint  ownership. 
PROPOSITION 4.  Not more than one agent should  have veto power 
over an asset. 
Proof.  Suppose  that agents  i and j both  have veto  power  over  an 
asset a,.  Then  take any coalition  S that has agent  i as a member,  but 
not agents.  Since i andj  both have veto power,  an is not contained  in 
oa(S)  or in a(oS\S). But this contradicts  proposition  3. Q.E.D. 
Proposition  4 reflects the fact that in our model,  investment  is made 
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can be  generalized  to include  this latter possibility but then,  among 
other  things,  proposition  4 may no  longer  hold.'6  For simplicity,  in 
this paper  we  have  chosen  not  to  pursue  the  possibility of  relaxing 
assumption  3. 
There  are two further  cases (in addition  to proposition  2) in which 
we can be sure that an agent should own a particular asset: namely, in 
which the asset is idiosyncratic to him and in which he is indispensable 
to the asset. 
DEFINITION.  An asset an is idiosyncratic  to an agent i if for all other 
agents the asset is irrelevant  to their marginal benefit.  That  is, for all 
agents j in any coalition  S and  for all sets A of  assets containing  an, 
vO(S,  A)  vl(S,  A\{an})  for allj  #  i. 
PROPOSITION  5.  If  an  asset  is idiosyncratic  to  an  agent,  then  he 
should  own  it. 
DEFINITION.  An  agent  i is indispensable  to  an  asset  an if,  without 
agent i in a coalition,  asset an has no effect  on the marginal product of 
investment  for the members  of that coalition.  That  is, for all agents 
in any coalition  S and  for all sets A of  assets containing  anl, 
vJ(S, A)  v(S,  A\{an})  if i ?! S. 
PROPOSITION  6.  If  an agent  is indispensable  to an asset, then  he 
should  own  it. 
If an asset is idiosyncratic  to an agent,  then,  a fortiori,  he is indis- 
pensable  to that asset. So it is enough  to prove  proposition  6. 
Proof of proposition  6.  Suppose  that agent  i is indispensable  to an 
asset  an, but  under  control  structure  a  he  does  not  own  it.  Then 
consider a new control structure &,  which is the same as a, except  that 
an is now owned  by i. It is straightforward  to confirm  that & satisfies 
requirements  (2) and  (3). 
The  change  Bj(&) -  Bj(ot) in  marginal  return  on  investment  for 
some  agent j  =# i will be 
A  p(S)[vJ(S,  t(S)  U  {an})  -  v(S,  a(S))] 
S I  iJE=S 
anda(S) 
-  >3  p(S)[vi(S,  t(S))  -  vl(S,  a(S)\{an})]. 
S  I  i0S;jES 
anoEa(S) 
16  For example,  suppose  that there  are just  two agents,  and at date 0 they together 
"invest" in building  a physical asset ready for sale at date  1. Whoever  owns the asset at 
date  1 will  get  the  proceeds.  Here,  ownership  by  one  agent  may  clearly  be  a  bad 
arrangement  since the other agent would have no incentive to invest. It may be better to 
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The second summation  is zero since i is indispensable  to an. The  first is 
nonnegative  by assumption  6. So agent j's marginal incentive  will not 
be reduced  by the change  in control  structure. 
Agent  i's own marginal  incentive  to invest cannot  fall as a result of 
now owning  asset an. Hence  by proposition  1, welfare  will be higher 
under  the new control  structure  & than under  a.  Q.E.D. 
We saw this result in the first part of the example  of the Introduc- 
tion. There  agent 3 (the tycoon) was indispensable,  and it was optimal 
to make him the owner  of  the asset. 
The  intuition  behind  the result is that if agent  i is indispensable  to 
an asset  an,  then  in order  for  an  agent j to derive  marginal  benefit 
from  this  asset  he  has  to  be  in  a coalition  that  both contains  i  and 
controls an. Not making i the owner of an would  serve only to reduce 
the  number  of  such  coalitions.  This  would  reduce  j's  incentive  to 
invest because  at the margin j invests to improve  his bargaining  posi- 
tion at date  1. Of course,  making  i the owner  of  al  will enhance  his 
own incentive to invest since then the asset would always be controlled 
by any coalition  of  which  he is a member. 
Proposition  6 is interesting  because it tells us that the importance  of 
an agent's action is only one  force  determining  an agent's ownership 
rights. A second  force  is the agent's importance  as a trading partner. 
In particular, if a subset of agents has investment  decisions, one cannot 
conclude  that ownership  rights of assets should  be concentrated  only 
on  this subset.  In fact, if some  agent  outside  the  subset is indispens- 
able, proposition  6 tells us that it is better to give all ownership  rights 
to this agent.'7 
Proposition  6 begs the question,  What happens  if a whole group of 
agents are indispensable  to an asset? In this case, one  (or more) of the 
group  should  always be given control  over the asset. In the extreme, 
when  all the  agents  are  indispensable  to  all  the  assets,  the  control 
structure  is unimportant.  The  reason  for this is that an agent's mar- 
ginal product  of investment  will be enhanced  by an asset only if he is 
in the grand coalition S (in any subcoalition,  there will be one or more 
indispensable  agents  missing).  And  S will control  all the assets, what- 
ever the control  structure.'8 
If we think of the asset(s) as a firm, or project, it would be rather an 
extreme  case if an entire group  of agents were literally indispensable. 
More realistically, we might  suppose  that there  is a group  of  agents 
who  are  key to  the  success  of  a project-in  the  sense  that they  are 
17 An exception  is the case in which only one agent has an action. Then  propositions 
2 and 6 tell us that it does not matter whether  this agent or the indispensable  agent has 
ownership  rights. 
18  There  is a caveat: S must control all the assets A. However, we know from proposi- 
tion 3 and at(0)  =  0  that this should  indeed  be the case. PROPERTY  RIGHTS  1135 
particularly skilled or knowledgeable-but  it would  not be a calamity 
if a few of  them  (say less than half) were absent. 
DEFINITION.  A  group  G of  agents  is a key group to an asset a7, if 
more  than  half  of  them  are  needed  to  generate  marginal  product 
from an. That is, for all agents i in any coalition S and for all sets A of 
assets containing  an, vz(S, A)  v'(S, A\{aJ}) if S contains  less than or 
equal to half of  the agents  in G. 
Suppose  that a group  G is key to an asset. Then  consider  any coali- 
tion  S  that  contains  more  than  half  of  the  agents  in  G. The  com- 
plementary  coalition,  S\S,  would  have  too  few  members  of  the  key 
group to benefit from the asset, and so control of it is best not given to 
them, but instead given to S. This  suggests  a possible explanation  for 
partnerships,  where  control  is decided  by majority rule.  If each of the 
members  of  G is given  a vote,  the right control  structure is ensured: 
only those coalitions S that contain a majority of G get control over the 
asset. Hence,  we have the  following  proposition. 
PROPOSITION  7.  If  a  group  of  agents  are  key  to  an  asset,  then 
control  of  the  asset  should  be  decided  by  simple  majority  voting 
among  them. 
Next,  we  turn  from  grouping  agents  to the  question  of  grouping 
assets. There  are many examples  of  assets that ordinarily are owned 
or  controlled  together:  for  example,  a window  of  a house  and  the 
house itself, a lock and a key, the engine  of a truck and its chassis, a list 
of clients' names and the list of their addresses, a baseball field and the 
spectator  stand,  the  two ends  of  a pipeline,  a railroad track and  the 
rolling  stock, and  power  stations and  the distribution  grid.  Why are 
these  assets  usually  paired  together,  even  though  in  principle  they 
could  be owned  or controlled  separately? 
DEFINITION.  Two assets am and an are (strictly) complementary  if they 
are unproductive  unless they are used  together.  That  is, for all coali- 
tions S and  for all sets A of  assets containing  am  and  an, 
vz(S, A\{am})  v'(S, A\{an})  v'(S, A\{am, an})  if  i E  S. 
PROPOSITION  8.  If two (or more)  assets are (strictly) complemen- 
tary, they should  be owned  or controlled  together. 
Proof.  Suppose  that am  and  an  are complementary  but that under 
control  structure  a  for  some  coalition  S, am E  a(S)  and  an ?!  a(S). 
Consider  a new  coalition  structure  &, which  is the  same as oa  except 
that whenever  any coalition  controls  am under  a,  that same coalition 
controls both am  and an under  &. It is straightforward  to confirm that & 
satisfies requirements  (2) and  (3). 
The  change  Bi(&) -  BQ(ot)  in  marginal  return  on  investment  for 
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I  p(S)[vz(S, u(S) U {an}) -  vz(S, t(S))] 
sties 
amao(S);an40(S) 
-  >1  p(S)[vz(S,  x(S)) -  vz(S, oa(S)\{an})]. 
amea(S\S);  anCa(S) 
The  second summation  is zero since am  and an are complementary.  By 
assumption  6,  the  first summation  is nonnegative.  So agent  i's mar- 
ginal incentive  to invest will not be reduced.  Hence  by proposition  1, 
welfare will be higher  under  the new control  structure & than under 
a.  Q.E.D. 
We  saw this  result  in  the  second  part of  the  example  in  the  In- 
troduction.  Recall the intuition:  in order  for an agent  to derive  mar- 
ginal benefit  from either  asset, he must be in a coalition that controls 
both.  Separating  control  of  the  assets  would  therefore  reduce  the 
number  of coalitions,  and this would  reduce  his incentive  to invest. 19 
We now consider  the opposite  extreme  of proposition  8. Supposing 
that there are no synergies  between  assets, can we conclude  that they 
should  be  owned  or  controlled  separately?  More  generally,  should 
ownership  extend  across agents  who  are economically  independent? 
And  related to this last question,  should  control  be given to an agent 
who is "dispensable" in the  following  sense? 
DEFINITION.  An agent k is dispensable  if the other  agents' marginal 
product of investment  is unaffected  by whether or not he is a member 
of their coalition (assuming the coalition controls a given set of assets). 
That  is, for  all coalitions  S containing  agent  k and  for  all sets A of 
assets, 
vI(S, A)  vI(S\{k}, A)  ifj  E  Sj  =  k. 
We  encountered  the  notion  of  dispensability  in  the  Introduction 
(the skipper  was dispensable).  The  idea  is that if agent  k were  not a 
member  of  a coalition,  the  coalition  members  could  hire  an outside 
agent  to replace  him. At the margin, in this coalition,  their individual 
product of investment  would  be unchanged.  Note  that dispensability 
is equivalent  to the existence  of a fixed  loss associated with having to 
hire someone  who is not as skilled as agent k; that is, v(S, A) =  V(S\fkl, 
A)  -  L, where L can depend  on Xk,  but not on x1,j #  k. 
19  Complementarity  is related to the notion  of increasing returns to scale. Increasing 
returns implies that two halves of an asset are separately less productive than the whole. 
Proposition  8 explains  why under  these  conditions  it may be desirable  for the whole 
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DEFINITION.  An agent k has some control  rights  if there is an asset an 
and a coalition  S containing  k such  that an  E  of(S) but an  ?  ot(S\{k}). 
PROPOSITION  9.  An  agent  who  is dispensable  and who  has no in- 
vestment  should  not  have  any  control  rights  if  stochastic  control  is 
possible. 
Proof.  See Appendix  A. 
An obvious and important  corollary of proposition  9 is that outside 
parties, defined  below,  should  not have any control  rights. 
DEFINITION.  An outside  party, agent  0, say, is an agent  who  is eco- 
nomically  independent  from  the other  agents.  That  is, for any set A 
of  assets and  any coalition  S not containing  agent  0, v(S U {0}, A)- 
v(S, A)  +  v(O). 
COROLLARY.  An outside  party should  not have any control  rights 
if stochastic control  is possible. 
At the intuitive level, this corollary to proposition  9 is compelling:  if 
outside  parties have control  rights,  then  the date  1 surplus  is shared 
among a larger set of agents at date  1. This dilution of the returns on 
investment  serves only to reduce  incentives  at date 0. The  same argu- 
ment would seem to apply to anyone  who has no investment; but as we 
know from  proposition  6, if an agent  is indispensable,  he should  be 
given  full  control  even  though  he  may have  no  investment.  Hence 
proposition  9 requires  not only that an agent  has no investment,  but 
also that he is dispensable. 
It is perhaps  surprising  that one  cannot rule out control by outside 
parties without  having  to resort  to stochastic schemes.  The  reason  is 
that  if  one  is  forced  to  use  a  deterministic  control  structure,  then 
outside  parties can play a useful  role  in dividing  up ownership.  For 
example,  if there are just  two agents,  1 and 2, in S,  then by introduc- 
ing an outside  party and (say) majority rule among  the three of them, 
agents  1 and  2 can be given  more  balanced  incentives  than if one  of 
them  owns.  However,  a  stochastic  control  structure  in  which  own- 
ership is randomly  allocated between  1 and 2 will be better because it 
avoids the dissipation  of  surplus  at date  1.20 
20 Consider  a symmetric  case in which agents  1 and 2 work with a single  asset, A  = 
{a}. Assume  that the  asset is essential  to both  agents  (in the  sense  that their marginal 
product  of  investment  is zero  if they  do  not  have  access to it) but that they  are both 
dispensable.  Without  the  introduction  of  an outside  party, there  is in effect  only one 
kind of  deterministic  control  structure  possible;  namely,  one  of  them  owns the  asset. 
Let this be agent  1. Then  their marginal  returns on investment  are, respectively,  v'(S, 
A)  and  I/2V2(S,  4).  Now  it may  be  that  '/2v2(S,  4)  provides  agent  2 with  too  low  an 
incentive  to invest. A control  structure  that instead  uses majority rule among  {0,  1, 2}, 
where  0 is an outside  party, changes  their  marginal  returns  to 2/3v'(S,  4)  and  2/3v2(S, 
A). However,  a stochastic control structure will do better: e.g., a 50:50  allocation of the 
asset at date  1 will raise their marginal  returns  to 3/4v'(S, 4)  and  3/4v2(S,  4). 
One can show that, even if stochastic control is ruled out, an outside  party should not 1138  JOURNAL  OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Proposition  9  implies  that  ownership  should  not  extend  across 
agents who are economically  independent;  and if there are no syner- 
gies between  assets, they should  not be owned or controlled  together. 
Owing  to  the  importance  of  this result,  we  have  written  it out  as a 
separate proposition  10. It is a direct application  of proposition  9, so 
no separate  proof  is needed. 
In what follows,  assume  that S and S are disjoint and that A and A 
are disjoint. 
DEFINITION.  (8,  A)  and  (S.,  A)  are  economically independent if 
for  all coalitions  S. S,where  SC  5  , SC  S,  and  for  all sets A, A of 
assets, where A C A, A C A, 
vl(SUSAUA)-v'(S,A)  ifiES 
and 
v (S U S, A U A)-v'(S,  A)  if i E  S. 
DEFINITION.  ($,  A)  and  (E, A)  exhibit  independent  control  if  no 
agent in S has control rights over any of the assets in A, and no agent 
in S has control  rights over  any of  the assets in A. 
PROPOSITION  10.  With  economic  independence  there  should  be 
independent  control.21 
Finally in this section,  we consider  the  effect  of  a change  in own- 
ership on an agent who works with an asset that is essential to him, for 
example,  a worker at a firm. The  important  point is that, outside  the 
firm, the worker's specific investment  is unproductive. 
DEFINITION.  An  asset  an  is essential  to  an  agent  i if  the  marginal 
product  of  investment  for  the  agents  in  a coalition  will  not  be  en- 
hanced  by  agent  i  unless  the  coalition  controls  a,.  That  is,  for  all 
agents j  in  any  coalition  S  and  for  all  sets A  of  assets,  v'(S,  A) 
v'(S\{i},  A) if an 5t A. 
Notice  that, in the light of assumption  3, the definition  implies that 
for agent  i himself  (i.e.,  for j  =  i), v'(S, A)  0 if at, ?! A.22 
PROPOSITION  11.  Suppose  that an agent with an investment  has an 
essential asset that is owned  by a second  agent. Then  if we ignore  the 
effects  of changes  in other  agents' investment  levels, the first agent's 
be the sole owner of an asset that is "essential" to another agent; see the definition  of an 
essential  asset before  proposition  11. 
21  If  stochastic  control  is  ruled  out,  then  proposition  10  would  require  that  the 
two groups  ? and  ? each  have  access  to outside  parties  for  the  purpose  of  dividing 
ownership. 
22  Strictly speaking,  proposition  11 requires  only  that v'(S, A)  0 if a,,  ?  A. How- 
ever,  the full definition  of  an essential  asset is used  elsewhere  in the  paper. PROPERTY RIGHTS  1139 
incentive  to  invest  will be  increased  if  the  second  agent  takes own- 
ership  of  all the assets. 
Proof.  See Appendix  A. 
The  intuition behind  this result is that if an asset an is essential to an 
agent i but another  agentj  owns it, then i's marginal return on invest- 
ment will be zero unless he is in a coalition withj.  Given thatj  owns an, 
i's incentive  to invest will be highest  if j owns all the other  assets too, 
because  that  way  i will  have  access  to  all those  assets  whenever  his 
investment  is productive,  and  at the  margin  this will enable  him  to 
strengthen  his bargaining  position  at date  1. 
Proposition  11 can help  us to rule out rather strange control  struc- 
tures; for example,  agent  i owns an asset a that is essential  to a group 
of workers, {w}, but at the same time an agents  owns an asset a* that is 
essential  to agent  i. This  corresponds  to a hybrid employment  struc- 
ture in which workers are employed  at one firm, while the boss of that 
firm is working  for another  firm. 
Proposition  11 suggests that it may be better to gather the two assets 
under  common  ownership.  Specifically,  the control  structure  should 
be  arranged  so  as to  have  only  one  boss-agent  j-at  the  top  of  a 
single firm  {a, a*}. However,  there  would  be  a drawback  to  this  ar- 
rangement  if, for example,  agent  i were indispensable,  because  then 
under  the new ownership  structure the workers {w} could be produc- 
tive only in a coalition  that contained  both i and j.  If i is dispensable, 
then this drawback disappears,  and as shown in the following  proposi- 
tion, we can rule out  the  hybrid arrangement. 
PROPOSITION  12.  Suppose  that an asset a is essential to a group  of 
workers {w} and an asset a* is essential  to an agent  i, who  is dispens- 
able. Then  if we ignore  the effects of changes  in investment  by parties 
other than ij,  and {w}, agent i should  not own a if a* is owned by some 
other  agent j. 
Proof.  See Appendix  A.23 
23  It is appropriate  at this point  to note  that the  results of  this section  generalize  to 
divisions of  surplus  other  than the Shapley  value,  in particular, the Banzhaf-Coleman 
index,  where p(S) in (4) is replaced  by 21-n  (see Owen  1982,  sec.  10.3); the  weighted 
Shapley value, where  the constants p(S) reflect the bargaining  abilities of the members 
of  S  (Kalai and  Samet  1988);  and  Kalai and  Samet's  egalitarian  solution,  which  for 
games with transferable  utility, as here,  reduces  to a particular weighted  Shapley value 
(Kalai and  Samet  1985). 
It is of interest to state general conditions  under which our results hold. Denote  by Bi 
agent is  share of total surplus, which will in general be a function  of the entire vector of 
values {v(S) IS C S} and also a function  of x. Then  propositions  1-8  and  11 are true as 
long as, in addition  to assumptions  1-6,  (i) Bi is concave  in x, (ii) Bi is weakly increasing 
in v(S) for  all S containing  i, and  (iii) dBMlav(S)  is weakly increasing  in v(S')  for  all S 
containing  i and  for  all St.  (Propositions  9,  10, and  12 require  a little  more:  a mild 
symmetry condition  on the division of surplus would suffice.) Notice that condition  i is a 
natural extension  of assumption  2, condition  ii is weak and very natural, but condition 
iii is strong  and certainly will not always be satisfied.  See the discussion  in Sec. V. 1140  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
IV.  Applications 
We now apply and develop  the results from the previous  section. We 
begin  with the case of  a single  asset. 
A.  One Asset 
Suppose  that J  workers,  w 1,  ...  ,  wJ, work with a single  asset, a, to 
supply  a service  to K consumers,  c 1, . ..  , cK. For simplicity assume 
that the asset is essential to the workers in the sense of Section III and 
that only they have investment  decisions.  Who should have ownership 
rights over  the asset? 
We have seen in Section III that an individual  is more likely to have 
ownership  rights  if his investment  is important  or if he is an impor- 
tant  (in  the  limit,  an  indispensable)  trading  partner.  Specifically,  if 
only one  of the workers has an investment  or one  of the consumers, 
say, is indispensable,  then that one should be the owner or boss (prop- 
ositions 2 and 6). More generally,  if there is a group G of "key" agents 
such that for any worker's marginal product of investment  to be posi- 
tive  he  must  be  a  member  of  a  coalition  containing  a  majority  of 
members  of  G (different  majorities  may  do  for  different  workers), 
then  it  is  optimal  to  give  each  member  of  G a vote  and  to  adopt 
majority  rule  (proposition  7).  Such  an  arrangement  can  be  inter- 
preted  as a partnership  if  G is a subset  of  {w1, . .  .,  wJ}, as a worker 
cooperative  if  G  =  {wl,  .  .  .,  wJ} (i.e.,  a  majority  of  all workers  is 
required  to realize a positive marginal product  of investment),  and as 
a consumer  cooperative  if G =  {c  1, . . . , cK}. 
To  get some insight  into the case in which there  is no group  of key 
agents, consider  the opposite  extreme  in which every agent is dispens- 
able. According  to  proposition  9,  ownership  rights  should  then  be 
allocated over those agents  that invest. Denote  this subset by H. Since 
everyone  is dispensable,  v2(S, {a}) =  v2LS,  {a}) for all i in any coalition S 
n H, where S is the coalition of all agents. So the first-order condition 
(FOC) (5) for agent  i's investment  xi simplifies  to piv'(L, {a}) =  (xi), 
where, from our discussion  of the Shapley value in Section II, pi is the 
probability that i belongs  to a coalition that owns a. Propositions  3 and 
9 together  imply that it is optimal  for every subset of H or its comple- 
ment to control a (if the control  structure is stochastic, this last condi- 
tion  holds  for  all realizations  of  the  control  structure).  From  this it 
follows  that 
Zpi  =  1/2  + 1/21H1  (6) 
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for an optimal  control  structure.24 Thus  if every agent  is dispensable, 
an optimal  control  structure  amounts  to an allocation  of the pi's sub- 
ject  to the constraint  (6). 
We can say more about the ownership  structure when every agent is 
dispensable  in two special cases. First, if there  is symmetry within the 
group H, that is, each agent's investment  has the same importance,  we 
might expect the optimum  to have pi =  1/2  +  11(21H  I)  for all i in H. It is 
interesting  to note  that if  I  H  is odd,  this can be achieved  by giving 
each member  of H a vote  and adopting  majority rule. 
Second,  suppose  that there  is one  "big" worker  and  many  "small" 
workers, in the  sense  that the big worker's investment  is an order  of 
magnitude  more important  than a small worker's (i.e., the social value 
of  a dollar  increase  in the  big worker's investment  is comparable  to 
the  social  value  of  a  simultaneous  dollar  increase  in  all  the  small 
workers' investments).  Then  the  analysis  above  tells us  that the  big 
worker  should  have  all the  control  rights.  (We are retaining  the  as- 
sumption  that everyone  is dispensable,  but it is easy to see that what 
follows  continues  to hold  if the  big  worker  is not  dispensable.)  The 
reason  is  that,  according  to  (6),  it  is  impossible  to  allocate  control 
rights to the small workers so as to yield pi's significantly above  1/2 for 
more  than a small fraction  of them.  But this means  that their aggre- 
gate  investment  will hardly  differ  from  what it would  be  if the  big 
worker were made  sole owner  and pi =  1/2 for each small worker. On 
the other hand, the big worker's investment  will be strictly higher if he 
is the owner.  Hence,  giving all control rights to the big worker will be 
optimal  in such a situation. 
In general,  we expect  to find something  in between  the extremes  in 
which  either  there  is a key  group  of  agents  that  everyone  needs  to 
trade with or agents  are dispensable.  Rather than analyzing this gen- 
eral situation,  however,  we turn  to a model  with two assets. 
B.  Two Assets 
Consider  now a situation in which there are two assets, a,  and a2, and 
assume  that  for  each asset  there  are  workers  to  whom  the  asset  is 
essential. One can imagine  that the workers of asset al use al to supply 
some service to the workers of asset a2, who then  use it together  with 
a2 to  produce  a final good  for  consumers.  For simplicity  we do  not 
24  To  see this, consider  any random  ordering  (e.g.,  {3,  1, 2, 5, 4}) of  members  of H' 
and  let  (i  =  1 if i belongs  to a coalition  that  controls  a and  (i  =  0 otherwise.  Now  reverse 
the ordering  (to obtain  (4, 5, 2,  1, 3}) and  denote  the  new (i's by (i. Then  it is easy to 
show that ZiEH  (i  +  wirH (i  =  I  HI +  1. Taking  the expectation  over all orderings  and 
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explicitly  model  final consumers  (or any other  input  suppliers);  one 
can suppose  that the good is sold (and other inputs are purchased)  on 
a spot market. 
To simplify further,  we shall suppose  that each asset a-, i =  1, 2, has 
one big worker i and many small workers {wi}, in the sense of subsec- 
tion  A  above,  where  each  small  worker  is  dispensable.  (To  avoid 
heavy notation,  we simply give the small workers the generic  descrip- 
tion wl  or w2; there is no presumption  that they are identical.) Under 
these conditions,  we know that it will not be optimal to give the small 
workers control  rights. 
Hence  the  issue  is whether  (i) a,  should  be  owned  by  1 and  a2 
should be owned  by 2 (which can be interpreted  as nonintegration,  with 
1 as the boss of the first firm and 2 as the boss of the second firm); (ii) 
1 should  own both  assets (integration  with  1 as boss of the  integrated 
firm); or  (iii) 2 should  own  both  assets  (integration  with  2 as boss). 
Actually, there is a fourth  possibility: (iv) 1 owns a2 and 2 owns al. We 
shall show at the  end  of this subsection  that this is not optimal. 
We start with possibilities i and ii and write the FOCs for the agents' 
investment  levels.  Bearing  in mind  that the  workers  wl  and  w2 are 
dispensable,  we can simplify  notation  and omit reference  to them  in 
the coalitions  of  agents.  For example,  v'(12,  {a,,  a2}) equals  l's mar- 
ginal  product  of  investment  in any coalitions  {1, 2} U S1 U S2 that 
control  assets a1 and  a2, where  S1 and S2 are, respectively,  arbitrary 
sets of  workers wl  and  w2. Also,  vwl(1,  {al}) equals a certain worker 
wl's  marginal  product  of  investment  in coalitions  {1} U S1 U S2  that 
control  asset a1, where  now S1 must contain  this particular worker. 
i.  Nonintegration:  1 Owns a1, 2 Owns a2 
FOC for  1: 
V/2v'(12,  {a,,  a2})  +  Y12v'(1, {al})  =  CQ(xl).  (7a) 
FOC for typical w 1: 
1/3vWl(I2,  {al,  a2})  +  1/6vWl(l, {al})  =  Cwl(xu'I).  (7b) 
FOC for 2: 
1/2v2(12, {a,,  a2}) +  /2v2 (2, {a2}) =  C2(x2).  (7c) 
FOC for typical w2: 
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ii.  Integration:  1 Owns a,  and a2 
FOC for  1: 
1/2v'(12,  {a,,  a2})  +  V12v'(1, {a,,  a2})  =  C  j(xl).  (7e) 
FOC for typical w 1: 
V3VWl(12,  {a,,  a2})  +  /6v"'l(1, {a,, a2}) =  CZ'I,I(Xr,1)-  (7f) 
FOC for  2: 
V2v2(12,  {a,,  a2}) =  C2(x2).  (7g) 
FOC for typical w2: 
L/3vW2(12,  {a,,  a2})  +  /6vzv2(1, {a,,  a2})  =  Cz,2(xz1,2).  (7h) 
We now use these conditions25 to compare the marginal incentive to 
invest under  nonintegration  and integration,  for each agent  in turn. 
Not surprisingly,  comparing  (7e) with (7a), we see that agent  1 has a 
greater incentive  to invest under  integration  since he then always has 
access to both assets. Correspondingly,  comparing  (7c) with (7g), we 
see that agent 2 has a greater incentive  to invest under nonintegration 
since he then  always has access to a2. 
What is more interesting  is the effect  of integration  on the employ- 
ees {wl} and {w2}. Comparing  (7f)  with (7b), we see that, ignoring  the 
effects of changes  in the other agents' investment  levels, a typical w l's 
incentive to invest is unambiguously  greater under  integration  (prop- 
osition  11). The  reason is that under either nonintegration  or integra- 
tion, wI has to be in a coalition  with  1 to be productive  at the margin 
since, by assumption,  he requires access to a,.  But under  integration, 
every time  he  is in a coalition  with  1, he also has access to a2 and  is 
therefore  more  productive. 
The  situation for a typical w2 is less clear since, in contrast to w 1, his 
boss  2  loses  control  when  switching  to  integration.  On  the  positive 
side,  w2  is  more  likely  to  have  access  to  both  assets  since  this  will 
25 To  understand  these  conditions,  it may be worth recapping  the "random order- 
ing" explanation  of  the  Shapley  value  that  we  gave  in  Sec.  II.  Consider  the  case of 
nonintegration.  With probability  1/2, agent  1 appears before  2 in the random  ordering 
at date  1 and receives his full marginal  product  vl(12,  {a,, a2}). With probability  1/2,  he 
appears after 2, in which case he receives vl(l,  {al})-bearing  in mind that he owns a, 
but not a2. This explains  (7a). In contrast, a worker wI has a positive marginal product 
only if he appears  before  1 in the random  ordering  (otherwise he is in a coalition  that 
does not have access to his essential asset aI). With probability 1/3,  he is before  1 and 2, in 
which case he receives vwl(12, {a,, a2}). With probability  1/6,  he is before  1 but after 2, in 
which case he receives  vwl(l,  {al}). This  explains  (7b). (The  missing  terms are 1/6vwl(2, 
{a2}) and  1svw'(0,  0),  which are both  zero.) The  six other  conditions  (7c)-(7h)  follow 
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happen  whenever  he is in a coalition  with his new boss  1; previously 
he had to be in a coalition  with both  1 and 2 for this to occur. On the 
negative  side,  under  integration,  w2 is less likely to find himself  in a 
coalition with his old boss 2 and asset a2; if this is a powerful  combina- 
tion, it can cause a loss. For example,  if 2 is indispensable  to a2 (implying 
vw2(1,  {a,,  a2}) =  0), a comparison  of  (7h) with  (7d) shows  that w2's 
incentive  to  invest  falls under  integration.  (We know  from  proposi- 
tion 6 that if agent  2 is indispensable  to an asset, then  he should  own 
it, which  means  that it cannot  be optimal  for  1 to acquire a2.) 
To  summarize,  there  are two effects  from  integration  on  employ- 
ees.  On  the  one  hand,  there  is  a  positive  effect  due  to  increased 
coordination:  agents  now  have  to negotiate  with only  one  person  to 
get access to both assets. (This positive effect  also applies to the boss of 
the  acquiring  firm: he  does  not  now  have  to bargain with anyone  to 
get access to both assets.) On the other  hand, there is a negative  effect 
due  to  the  fact  that  an  employee  of  the  acquired  firm  now  has  to 
negotiate  with two people  to have access to both his essential asset and 
his old  boss.  (This  negative  effect  also applies  to the  boss of  the  ac- 
quired  firm.) 
In some special cases, we can say which effect will dominate.  First, if 
2 is dispensable,  the  negative  effect  on  the employee  w2 disappears:26 
vw2(1, {al, a2}) ?  vw2(2, {a2}). In this case, then, the only cost of integra- 
tion is the  negative  incentive  effect  on  agent  2. 
Second,  if assets a,  and  a2 are economically  independent  in the sense 
that v'(SI U S2, {al, a2}) =  vO(Si,  {al}) for all i E  S1 and vz(SI U  S2, {a1, 
a2}) =  vO(S2,  {a2}) for all i E S2-where  SI and S2 are any subcoalitions 
of  {1  +  workers  wl}  and  {2  +  workers  w2},  respectively-then 
nonintegration  always dominates  integration  (proposition  10).  (The 
FOCs [7a], [7b], [7e], and [7f] imply that the incentives of  1 and wl  are 
unchanged  under  integration,  while  [7c], [7d],  [7g],  and  [7h] imply 
that the incentives  of 2 and w2 are reduced.)  This  simply reflects the 
fact that in the absence of a synergy between  assets a, and a2, making 
1 the  owner  of  asset a2 is like bringing  in an outside  party: its only 
effect  is to dilute  incentives  (proposition  9). 
Third,  if assets al and a2 are (strictly) complementary  in the sense that 
vO(S,  {al})  =  vz{S, {a2}) =  vO(S, 0)  =  0 for all i in any coalition S, then 
integration  always dominates  nonintegration  (proposition  8). This fol- 
lows from the fact that v2(2, {a2}) and vw2(2, {a2}) are both zero in (7c) 
and (7d), and hence  the negative  incentive  effects  of integration  on 2 
26  This  is similar  to the  effect  in proposition  12. Recall that, in the  context  of  that 
proposition,  an asset a (-a2)  is essential  to an agent w (-w2).  The  agent's incentive  to 
invest does not fall when  agents  (=  1) takes over the ownership  of a from agent i (-  2), 
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and w2 disappear.  In words,  suppose  that two assets are (at the mar- 
gin) useless unless used together,  but they are owned  by two different 
people.  Then  making  one  of  these  people  the  owner  of  both  assets 
will help  outside  agents,  who  now  have  to  negotiate  with  only  one 
person  rather than two people  in order  to use them.  (And of course 
the owner himself  can now use both assets without having to negotiate 
with anyone  else.) The  person who used to own one of the assets does 
not  lose  out  since  he  could  not  use  the  asset  without  reaching  an 
agreement  with the  other  person  anyway. Of  course,  this argument 
does not tell us that  1 should  be the owner  rather than 2; it says only 
that the assets should  be under  common  ownership. 
Once we leave these special cases, the costs and benefits are less easy 
to evaluate.  The  main forces  are summarized  in table  1. 
As noted  before,  there  are two other  cases to consider:  (iii) 2 can 
own both assets or (iv) 1 owns a2 and 2 owns a,  ("reverse" nonintegra- 
tion).  Obviously,  considerations  similar  to  those  above  determine 
when  it is better  to concentrate  both  assets in 2's hands  than to have 
them separately owned.  The  choice of making either 2 or 1 the owner 
of both assets will be determined  by factors such as who has the more 
important  investment  or who is the less dispensable.  Finally, it is easy 
to show that reverse  nonintegration  is never  optimal;  it is dominated 
by making  1 the owner  of both assets. This  follows from  the fact that 
ownership  by  1 will raise the incentives  of  1 and the workers w 1 and 
cannot lower the incentives  of 2 and the workers w2 since these agents 
had to reach agreement  with  1 anyway to have access to a2. 
C.  Three  Assets 
New  effects  arise  when  there  are  more  than  two assets.  We do  not 
have space to be comprehensive,  but we would  like to discuss briefly 
the effects  on  a third  firm of  two firms' merging. 
To simplify, we ignore  employees  now and suppose  that each of the 
three assets {al,  a2, a3}  has just one (big) agent working on it: agents  1, 
2, and 3, respectively.  As above, asset ai is assumed  to be essential  for 
agent  i.  We  further  simplify  by  assuming  that  all three  agents  are 
dispensable.  As a final  simplification,  in this subsection  we consider 
only control  structures  ox  in which each asset has a sole owner.  In the 
following  subsection,  we shall briefly discuss multiple  ownership  in a 
model  that has more  assets. 
The  first finding  is that if an agent  does  not  own  the  asset that is 
essential to him, then he should  not own any other asset. To  see why, 
note  that  such  an  arrangement  would  be  equivalent  to  one  of  the 
following  (subject to relabeling):  2 owns a, and 3 owns a2, or 2 owns a, 
and  1 owns a2. Both  arrangements  would  be dominated  by having  3 z 
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owning a,,  a2, and a3 (he may already own a3): obviously 3's incentive 
to invest would increase, but so too would  l's and 2's since each had to 
be in a coalition  with one  other  person  to be productive  anyway.  In 
fact we  know  from  proposition  12 that the  first arrangement  is not 
optimal,  given  that 2 is dispensable. 
This  leaves  us  with  three  possibilities  (subject  to  relabeling):  (i) 
nonintegration  (1 owns a1, 2 owns a2, and 3 owns a3), (ii) partial integra- 
tion (I owns al and a2, and 3 owns a3), and (iii) integration  (1 owns al, a2, 
and a3). 
Partial integration  is the distinctive new control structure in a three- 
asset model.  The  main new effect  is that if 1 acquires a2, then this has 
an impact on  3. So how are 3's  incentives  affected  by a change  from 
nonintegration  to  partial  integration?  The  FOCs  for  3's  choice  of 
investment  X3 in these  two cases are written out below. Since all three 
agents are dispensable,  we can omit reference  to the coalitions in the 
marginal products,  vi, and simply write, say, v3(aI, a2, a3) for any one 
of v3(3,  {aI, a2, a3}), v3(13,  {aI, a2, a3}), v3(23,  {a,,  a2, a3}), or v3(123,  {al, 
a2,  a3l)- 
i.  Nonintegration 
FOC for  3: 
1/3v3(ai,  a2,  a3)  +  1/6V3(al,  a3)  +  1/6v3(a2,  a3)  +  1/3V3(a3)  =  C3(x3). 
ii.  Partial Integration 
FOC for  3: 
1/2V3(al,  a2,  a3)  +  '/2v3(a3)  =  CQ(x3). 
Thus  if we ignore  the  effects  of  changes  in the other  agents' invest- 
ment  levels,  agent  3  will  have  a  greater  incentive  to  invest  under 
partial integration  than under  nonintegration,  provided  that 
v3(a_  , a2,  a3)  +  v3(a3)  >  v3(ai,  a3)  +  v3(a2,  a3).  (8) 
A sufficient  condition  for  (8) to hold  is that  1 and 3 obtain limited 
synergy in the absence  of 2, or that 2 and 3 obtain limited synergy in 
the absence  of  1. In the first case (in approximate  terms), 
v(13, {a,, a3})  =  v(l,  {rz1})  +  v(3,  {a3})  Z  v3(aI,  a3)  =  v3(a3) 
>  (8) holds. 
In the second  case (in approximate  terms), 1148  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
v(23,  {a2,  a3})  =  v(2,  {a2})  +  v(3,  {a3})  t>  v3(a2,  a3)  =  v3(a3) 
> (8) holds. 
There  are,  however,  circumstances  in  which  agent  3  will have  a 
greater  incentive  to invest  under  nonintegration  than  under  partial 
integration.  If the assets a,  and a2 are close substitutes-in  the sense 
that the main synergies occur between  1 and 3 or 2 and 3-then  v 3(a1, 
a2, a3) is likely to be close to both v3(a,,  a3) and v3(a2, a3), and (8) will 
not  hold.  Here,  3's incentives  are greater  when  a,  and  a2 are sepa- 
rately owned,  so that their owners  1 and 2 have to compete  with each 
other  for  access  to his asset a3. That  is, as one  might  expect,  if two 
competing  traders  merge,  this  will  worsen  the  incentives  of  the 
owner-manager  of  a firm that trades with them. 
D.  Many Assets 
In subsection  C, we focused  on  the case in which each of the  (three) 
assets had  a single  owner.  In  order  to  obtain  some  insight  into  the 
circumstances  in which  multiple  ownership  will be selected,  consider 
the following. 
There  are N assets (firms), A  =  {al,.  .I  , aN}, and N agents, S  =  {1, 
.  , N}. We make the standard assumption  that asset ai is essential to 
agent  i. We also assume  that all the agents  are dispensable. 
Agent  1 uses a,  to supply firms a2, . ..  , aN. The  particular interpre- 
tation that we have in mind is that al is an oil pipeline  and a2, . .  .  aN 
are oil refineries  (this case is discussed  in Klein et al. [1978]).  A fairly 
natural assumption  to make then  is that the only synergies  are bilat- 
eral, between  al  and  each  of  a2,  .  .  .  , aN. Note  that a2,  .  .  .  , aN are 
useless in the absence  of al.  Thus  for all i =  1 in any coalition  S and 
for all sets A of  assets, we are assuming  that 
vz(S, A)  =  vz(S, {aI, ai})  if aI, ai E A 
=  0  otherwise. 
(Note  the  implicit  assumption  that there  is no  capacity constraint  in 
the pipeline.) 
Since a2,  .  . . , aN are useless  without  al,  we expect  some  common 
ownership  to be optimal  here.  If  1's investment  is particularly impor- 
tant,  there  is a case  for  1 owning  all the  assets  (integration  down- 
stream). On the other hand, if l's investment  can be ignored  but those 
of  2,  .  .  .  , N  are  important  (as is arguably  the  case  in the  pipeline 
example),  then 2, ..  ., N will share control rights in a1 (proposition  9). 
Suppose  that  l's investment  x,  can be ignored.  Given our assump- 
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p~vC(S, {a,,  al})  =  C(x,)  for  2  ?  i ?  N, 
where p, is the  probability  that i belongs  to a coalition  that owns a,. 
Now,  as in (6), 
N 
L  pI  =  1/2N.  (9) 
z=2 
Hence an optimal control structure amounts to an allocation of the pI's 
across the agents 2, .  .  , N, in accordance  with the responsiveness  and 
importance  of  their  investments,  subject to (9). One  way to achieve 
such an allocation is to give (not necessarily equal) shares or votes in al 
to each agent  2, . . . , N and adopt  simple  majority rule (this guaran- 
tees that proposition  3 holds); obviously,  an agelit's pI will be increas- 
ing in the number  of  votes  he receives. 
Arrangements  like  these  are  in  fact  observed  in  the  case  of  oil 
pipelines,  with  an  agent's  share  being  linked  to  his  use  of  the 
pipeline.27 To  the extent  that usage  is in turn related  to investment, 
this finding  is consistent  with the model  presented  here.28 
The  multiasset  analysis can be extended  in several ways. First, the 
assumption  of  dispensability  can  be  dropped.  In  the  example  just 
discussed,  this  would  have  the  consequence  that  allocating  control 
rights in al to agent i rather than agent  1 will have a negative effect on 
fs  incentives  to the  extent  that access to agent  1 as well as asset  1 is 
important  for j.  Second,  the assumption  that there  is only one  agent 
per  asset  can  be  relaxed.  We  leave  such  generalizations  for  future 
work. 
V.  Concluding  Remarks 
In this paper, we have developed  a theory of the optimal assignment 
of  assets and  used  it to understand  the  boundaries  of  the  firm. We 
have shown that an agent is more likely to own an asset if his action is 
sensitive to whether  he has access to the asset and is important  in the 
generation  of  surplus,  or if he is a crucial trading  partner for others 
whose  actions  are  sensitive  to whether  they  have  access to the  asset 
and  are important  in  the  generation  of  surplus.  In addition,  if one 
starts from a situation in which some agent  1 owns an asset al worked 
on by workers {wl} and some  agent  2 owns an asset a2 worked on by 
workers {w2}, a move to common  ownership  of both assets by agent  1 
27 See Klein et al. (1978).  In practice, the owners  of the pipeline  include  oil wells as 
well as oil refineries;  it would be easy to extend  the analysis above to allow some of the a, 
to stand for oil wells. 
28  These  ideas  might  also  be  applied  to  the  case  of joint  ownership  of  bridges  by 
different  railroads in the  nineteenth  century  (see Chandler  1977,  p.  124). 1150  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
is likely to increase overall efficiency  to the extent that (i) the assets are 
strongly complementary,  (ii) 1 is an important  trading  partner  for 2 
and  the  workers  {w2}, (iii) 2  is dispensable  or  his investment  is not 
particularly important,  and (iv) 1 has an important  investment  or the 
workers {wl} have important investments  (in aggregate).  On the other 
hand, common  ownership  is likely to decrease overall efficiency to the 
extent  that  (i) the  assets  are  economically  independent,  (ii) 2  is an 
important  trading  partner  for the workers {w2}, (iii) l's investment  is 
not particularly important,  and (iv) 2 has an important investment  or 
the asset a2 is idiosyncratic  to him. 
An important  idea  underlying  the analysis is that a key right pro- 
vided  by ownership  is the  ability to exclude  people  from  the  use of 
assets. We have argued  that this authority  over  assets translates into 
authority over people:  an employee  will tend  to act in the interest of 
his boss.  Although  we  have  emphasized  the  role  of  tangible  assets 
such as machines  (or inventories),  location,  or client lists, we suspect 
that the  ideas  may  generalize  to  intangible  assets  such  as goodwill. 
Some nonhuman  assets are essential  for the argument,  however,  and 
in fact we suspect that they are an important  ingredient  of any theory 
of the firm. The  reason is that in the absence of any nonhuman  assets, 
it is unclear  what authority  or control  means.  Authority  over  what? 
Control  over  what?  Surely  integration  does  not  give  a  boss  direct 
control  over workers' human  capital, in the absence  of slavery.  29 
An important  assumption  that we have made is that the gains from 
bargaining  are divided  according  to the  Shapley  value.  This  is obvi- 
ously strong,  but we do not believe  that the assumption  is crucial for 
29  For a more extensive  discussion of the notion of authority, see 0.  Hart (1989). This 
view of  physical assets and  authority  can  shed  light  on  the  well-known  criticism that 
Alchian and Demsetz  (1972)  made of Coase's (1937)  paper.  Coase argued  that the key 
difference  between  an employer-employee  relationship  and one between  independent 
contractors is that whereas an employer  can tell an employee  what to do, one indepen- 
dent  contractor  must  persuade  another  independent  contractor  to do  what he wants 
through  the  use  of  prices  (see  also Simon  1951;  Arrow  1974).  Alchian  and  Demsetz 
pointed  out that an employer  typically cannot  force an employee  to do what he wants: 
he can only ask him and fire the employee  if he refuses.  However,  this is no different 
from one  independent  contractor's  firing another  (quitting their relationship)  if he is 
unhappy  with the latter's performance  (an employer  can "fire or sue, just as I can fire 
my grocer by stopping  purchases  from  him or sue him for delivering  faulty products" 
[Alchian  and  Demsetz  1972,  p.  777]).  Our  approach  reconciles  these  two  positions. 
While  it follows  Alchian  and  Demsetz  in  not  distinguishing  between  the  contractual 
form or nature of sanctions in the two relationships,  it captures the idea that one agent 
is more likely to do what another agent wants if they are in an employment  relationship 
than  if  they  are  independent  contractors.  The  reason  the  manager  of  Alchian  and 
Demsetz's  grocery  store  will be more  likely to follow  their  wishes if they  employ  him 
than if they are customers  is that in the former  case his future  livelihood  depends  on 
them  (they control  the assets the manager  intends  to work with), whereas  in the latter 
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our results. Two  observations  support  this. First, we have mentioned 
a number of immediate  extensions  of our analysis in note 23. Second, 
the  example  in  the  Introduction  makes  clear  that,  in  the  simplest 
setting in which each agent's investment  decision  is zero-one  and in- 
vestment  is socially productive,  the result that assets should be owned 
by  indispensable  trading  partners  and  that  strictly complementary 
assets should be commonly  owned  will hold under  weak assumptions. 
All we really require  is that individual  i's share of  a fixed  amount  of 
surplus will be smaller the more people  whose agreement  he requires 
to capture  this surplus.  This  is likely to be satisfied by any reasonable 
bargaining  solution. 
Once we depart from the simple zero-one  case, however,  the Shap- 
ley value  and  our  other  assumptions  become  more  important.  The 
driving force behind  all our results is the idea that agents underinvest 
because  some  of  the benefits  from  their investment  are dissipated  in 
future bargaining.  Assets are allocated  so as to mitigate this underin- 
vestment.  Once  we  allow  more  general  specifications  of  the  model, 
however,  underinvestment  is not inevitable.  For example,  if assump- 
tion 6 is violated,  the left-hand  side of  (5) may exceed  v'(S, A Ix) and 
some  agents  may  overinvest relative  to  the  first-best. The  same  out- 
come  can occur,  even  if assumption  6 holds,  if we depart  from  the 
Shapley  value  and  the  marginal  incentive  to  invest  is  no  longer  a 
weighted  sum of  the vt(S, A Ix). 
If  agents  overinvest  relative  to  the  first-best, far from  wanting  to 
increase investment  incentives,  they  may want to reduce  them.  That 
is, holdups  may be good,  not bad! Thus  it may be positively desirable 
to keep  assets away from  indispensable  trading  partners  or split up 
complementary  assets,  in  order  to  reduce  incentives  to  invest  and 
bring investment  closer  to its efficient  level. 
A  similar possibility  arises  when  agents  must  choose  what  type of 
action  to  take as well as what  level.  For instance,  suppose  that skill 
acquisition is costless,  but agent  1 must decide  at date 0 what type of 
skill to acquire. Assume  that agent  1 will later trade with an indispens- 
able agent  2 and another  agent  3, using a single asset a (imagine  that 
there are only three agents in the economy  and that agents 2 and 3 do 
not invest). If agent 3 owns the asset, agent  1 will choose xl at date 0 to 
maximize  1/3v(123, aIx) since he recognizes  that he must reach agree- 
ment with both agents  2 and 3 to realize the date  1 gains from trade 
(see [4]). This yields the first-best. On the other hand, if agent 2 owns 
the asset, agent  1 maximizes  1/3v(123, aix) +  1/6v(12,  a I  x) (again by [4]). 
This  is typically not  first-best. We see  then  that when  type of  action 
rather  than  level  of  action  is important,  it may be better  to give  an 
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who is (agent 2); doing  so encourages  the investing  agent to select the 
type of skill that is appropriate  for the grand coalition rather than for 
a subcoalition. 
How important  overinvestment  and type of action effects  are rela- 
tive to underinvestment  effects  in empirical  terms is, of course,  hard 
to say. Note  that, even in the presence  of such effects,  the framework 
we  have  put  forward  is helpful  in  determining  optimal  patterns  of 
ownership. 
Another  strong  assumption  made  is  that  ex  post  bargaining  is 
efficient  and inefficiencies  arise only  with respect  to ex ante  actions. 
We feel,  however,  that in stressing  ex  ante inefficiencies,  we may be 
picking up some of the same effects  that an ex post inefficiency  model 
would  generate.  For example,  an ad hoc way of introducing  ex  post 
inefficiencies  is to  assume  that  any  ex  post  trade  or  agreement  be- 
tween two individuals  will with some small probability not be consum- 
mated even  if it is mutually  advantageous.  This  implies  roughly  that 
assets should  be allocated  at date 0 so as to minimize  the number  of 
new agreements  that have to be reached  at date  1. This suggests  that 
an  agent  who  is crucial  for  the  generation  of  surplus  should  have 
ownership  rights  (agreement  will have to be reached  with the  agent 
anyway, so why increase  the number  of agreements  necessary by giv- 
ing ownership  rights to others), and that highly complementary  assets 
should  be owned  together  (since coordination  of  these  assets is cru- 
cial, the total number  of agreements  is reduced  by having one  person 
control them all). But these conclusions  are also implications of the ex 
ante  analysis.  In  other  words,  the  ex  ante  analysis  appears  able  to 
capture some of the coordination  issues that are central to an ex post 
perspective,  in addition  to incorporating  the role of investment  incen- 
tives. This  is not to deny,  of  course,  that in future  work it would  be 
very desirable to analyze the consequences  of ex post inefficiencies  in 
a systematic manner,  for example,  by introducing  asymmetric  infor- 
mation. 
There  are a number  of  other  possible  extensions  of  the  analysis. 
Our model ignores  payoff  uncertainty,  risk aversion, and wealth con- 
straints. This  means  that the  issue  of  how  an investment  should  be 
financed and how ownership  rights should be allocated between those 
who finance it and those who manage  it plays no part in our analysis. 
Yet we believe  that this issue is important  for many firms.30 In addi- 
tion,  we have ignored  issues  having  to do  with the  dissemination  of 
information  and with how coordination  takes place between  individ- 
uals with different  sources of information  but possibly similar goals.3' 
30  Recent  papers  that investigate  the financing  issue are Aghion  and Bolton  (1988), 
Grossman and  Hart (1988),  Harris and  Raviv (1988),  and  Hart and  Moore  (1989). 
31  This  is the focus  of  the  team  theory  literature  (see Marschak and Radner  1972). PROPERTY  RIGHTS  1153 
An indication of this is that in our model an employer  never has to tell 
an employee  what to do:  the  employee  simply figures  it out  himself 
and acts accordingly.  It seems very desirable  to relax this assumption 
in future  work.  Finally,  we  have  supposed  that each  agent's  invest- 
ment  or  action  enhances  his  own  productivity,  but  not  that  of  the 
assets he works with (see assumption  3). There  is no reason,  however, 
why the analysis could  not be generalized  to include  asset-enhancing 
investments. 
In spite of  its restrictive  assumptions,  we believe  that our  analysis 
has identified  some  of  the- forces  determining  the boundaries  of  the 
firm. For example,  it can explain  why a firm faces first increasing and 
then  decreasing  returns  to scale (increasing  returns  due  to the  posi- 
tive  benefits  of  coordinating  complementary  assets  [proposition  8] 
and decreasing  returns due to the inefficiencies  of centralized  control 
as  new  managers  with  economically  independent  roles  must  be 
brought  in  [proposition  10]). And,  as we have seen  in Section  IV,  it 
can throw  light  on  ownership  arrangements  when  several firms de- 
pend  on  a single  supplier  for  an input  (e.g.,  an oil pipeline).  At the 
same time, the model in its present state cannot explain the delegation 
of  control  or  the  determination  of  hierarchical  structure  within  a 
firm. Our hope  is that such  factors can be understood  in generaliza- 
tions of  the model.  In addition  we hope  that the model  or its exten- 
sions will throw light on  integration  decisions  in particular empirical 
contexts.32 Our  purpose  in writing  this paper  has been  to provide  a 
framework  for analysis; much  remains  to be done  in the application 
of  this framework  and its further  development. 
Appendix A 
In this Appendix, we prove propositions 1, 9, 11, and 12. 
Proof of Proposition 1 
The Nash equilibrium  investments  x4(o)  are characterized  by (5), which using 
assumption  (3) can be rewritten  as (restricting  attention to those agents i who 
have investments,  x- >  0) 
Vg(x;  cX)  Ix=xc(cX)  =  0, 
where 
g(x; a)  p(S)v(S, a(S)Ix)  -  I  Ci(xi)1 
all S  mr  t 
In principle there may be more than one vector x'(a) satisfying  (5). For the 
32  As discussed  in Chandler  (1977),  say; for  a survey  of  recent  empirical  work, see 
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moment,  for  a  given  a,  select  one  such  vector.  In  fact  we  shall  prove 
uniqueness  below. 
Now  consider  the  change  in  control  structure  from  a  to  & given  in  the 
proposition.  By assumption,  Vg(x; &) 2  Vg(x; a)  for all x. 
Defined  (x; X)  Xg(x; &) +  (1  -  X)g(x; a) for X E  [0, 1]. Also define x(A) to 
solve Vf (x; X) =  0. Totally  differentiating,  we obtain 
H(x;  X)dx(X)  =  -[Vg(x;  &) -  Vg(x; ot)]dX, 
where H(x; X) is the  Hessian  of f (x; X) (with respect  to x). By assumptions  1 
and  2, H(x;  X) is negative  definite.  Also,  by assumption  4,  the  off-diagonal 
elements  of H(x; X)  are nonnegative.  So H(x; X)  is a nonpositive  matrix (see, 
e.g.,  Takayama  1985, p. 393,  theorem  4.D.3  [III"] and [IV"]). Hence  dx(X)/ax 
O0, and  x(1)  -  x(O) or  xe(&)  - xe(a). 
It  is  now  trivial  to  confirm  that  the  Nash  equilibrium  investments  are 
unique for a given a. Simply set & =  (x  in the previous paragraphs and use the 
facts that xe(&)  2  x'(ao) and xe(a)  - xe(&). 
Similar reasoning  can be used to show that xe(a) '  x*. Simply replace g(x; &) 
in the argument  above by the social surplus W(x), and replaced (x; X)  by XW(x) 
+  (1  -  X)g(x; a). As was pointed  out in Section  II, assumption  6 and condi- 
tion (3) together  imply VW(x) -  Vg(x; a) for all x. By assumptions  1 and 2, the 
Hessian  of  W(x) is negative  definite.  The  rest of  the  argument  is the  same; 
hence  x* 2  xe(ao). 
Finally, since VW(xe(&)) -  Vg(xe(&)) =  0 and  xe(&)  2  xe(o),  it follows  from 
the concavity of  W(x) that W(xe(&)) -  W(xe(a)). Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition  9 
In  this  proposition,  a control  structure  ox may  be  stochastic.  Suppose  that 
under  some  realization of a, an agent  k has some control  rights even  though 
he  is  dispensable  and  has  no  investment.  Then  consider  a  new  stochastic 
control  structure  &, which  is the  same  as a  except  that  (in this  realization) 
agent k's control rights are now allocated randomly  at date  1 to the other I  - 
1 agents on an equal basis. It is straightforward  to confirm  that each realiza- 
tion of & satisfies (2) and  (3), as required. 
The  expected  change EB'(6)  -B2(a)  in marginal return on investment  for 
some  agent  i 5  k will be (let s  =  |S) 




-  E  (1  -  I  1 )p(S)[vI(S.  o(S))  -  v'(S, a(S\{k}))]. 
Since agent  k is dispensable,  this equals 
>  q(S, k)[v1(S,  ot(S U {k})) -  vi(S,  0e(S))], 
slIs 
SI  iE=S PROPERTY  RIGHTS  1155 
where 
q(S,  k) =  _ 
s 
p(S) -  (1 -(  _  )p(S  U {k}) 
s!(I -  s -  1)!  I-s  (1  s] 
s!(I -s-i)!  (1 
I!  VI -  1i) 
Hence by assumption  6, the marginal  incentive  to invest  by any agent i $ k  will 
not be reduced by the change in control structure. By assumption, agent k 
himself has no investment. So from proposition 1, welfare will be higher 
under the new control structure  a  than under a. Q.E.D. 
Proof  of Proposition  11 
Suppose that asset an is essential to agent i and that under some control 
structure  a another agentj owns an. Then consider a new control structure  & 
in which  j owns all the assets  A; &  trivially  satisfies  requirements  (2) and (3). 
The change B;(&)  -  B,(o) in marginal  return on investment  for agent i will 
be 
p(S)v'(S,  A) -  p(S)vi(S,  a(S)) 
slies  SIjES 
+  p(S)vI(S,  0)  -  p(S)vz(S,  a(S)). 
S  IiE-SJ  SIiES  IJes  js1 
? 
The last summation is zero because  j  t S implies an It  a(S) and, by assump- 
tion, an is essential  to agent i. Also, assumption  6 implies that the first  summa- 
tion is no less than the second. So, if the effects of changes in other agents' 
investment levels are ignored, agent i's marginal incentive to invest will be 
increased  by the change in control structure.  Q.E.D. 
Proof  of Proposition  12 
Suppose that a is a control structure  in which agentj owns asset  a* and agent i 
owns asset a. Define a new control structure  &,  which is the same as ax  except 
that now agents exercises all the control that agent i used to exercise under ax. 
It is straightforward  to confirm that &  satisfies  requirements  (2) and (3). 
In what follows, we ignore the effect of changes in the level of investment 
by agents other than agents ij,  and {w}.  Clearly,  agentf"s  marginal  incentive 
to invest will be higher under & than under a  since he now controls more 
assets.  Agent i's incentives  will not change: under both a and &,  he has to be in 
a coalition  with  j in order to gain access to a*, so it does not matter thatj has 
his control rights. 
The change  Bw(&)  -  BwXa)  in marginal  return on investment  for a worker  w 
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p(S)v'(S,  a(S  U  {i}))  -  p(S)vw(S,  (S)) 
Si jS  sI iwsS  wE-S  jo-S 
+  >  p(S)vW(S, a(S\{i}))  -  p(S)vW(S,  (S)). 
s  l~eass  sIlowes 
i, 
E=S  iS  1,wE 
The last two summations  are both zero because if a coalition  does not contain 
agent i, then under a it does not control a, which is essential to w. The first 
summation  is no less than the second because of assumption  6 together with 
the facts that (i) agent i is dispensable  and (ii)  p(S) is a function only of the size, 
not of the composition, of coalition S. Thus w's marginal  incentive to invest 
will be increased  by the change in control structure.  Q.E.D. 
Appendix B 
In the model of Section II, agents make investments  in human capital  at date 
0 that affect their productivities  at date 1. In this Appendix, we briefly  extend 
the model to learning by doing and signaling activities. 
Learning  by  Doing 
This is a slight variant  on the model of Section II. During period 0, each agent 
i works  an amount x, (rather than simply invests in training). However, he 
learns  as he works;  and so, as in Section II, the total  value V(x)  at date 1 will  be 
an increasing function of (xi, .  .  , x1). The only new effect is that during 
period 0, in addition to the cost C,(x,),  each agent i receives  a (private)  benefit 
wi(x),  which represents  his share of the fruits of date 0 production.  Since w,  in 
general  depends on x  as well as xt,  this creates  further externalities.  Typically, 
though, these will serve only to reinforce the underactivity  of proposition 1 
because  of the usual moral hazard  effect in teams. Hence all the propositions 
and results  from Sections III and IV apply. For a formal model, see Hart and 
Moore (1988, sec. 5). 
Signaling  Type  through  Choice  of Action 
In this model agents have unknown abilities, for example, their aptitude, 
trustworthiness,  loyalty,  or simply their willingness  to work hard. There is no 
training  or learning  by doing during period 0. Rather,  an agent works  hard at 
date 0 in order to convince  other agents that he is of high ability.  That way,  he 
will  be in a position to command a larger share of the date 1 total value. As in 
Sections III and IV, he will have a greater incentive to work hard if, for 
example, assets that are important to him are owned by people who are 
important to him. In short, it matters who his boss is. An optimal control 
structure distributes ownership of  assets so as to provide the best overall 
incentives for agents to work hard at building their reputations. 
In  Hart and Moore (1988), this idea is formalized using Holmstrom's 
(1982) model of reputation. Suppose that each agent i has a true ability  o, 
drawn  from a publicly  known  ex ante distribution.  In period 0, agent i (know- PROPERTY  RIGHTS  1157 
ing the distribution of Oi  but not its value) takes an uncontractible  action xi, for 
example,  effort.  All agents then observe yi =  xi +  Oi,  but xi remains unobserv- 
able to agents  other  than i. This  means  that, given  a period  0 Nash  equilib- 
rium of actions xi, the other  agents  conclude  that agent i has ability Oi =  yi - 
x:. At date  1, the  (perceived)  total value  is divided  according  to the  Shapley 
value, with each agent's share being  sensitive  to the perceived  vector of abili- 
ties. (No  further  effort  is exerted  in the second  period  since,  given  that the 
world ends  after  this, there  is no reason  to build  any further  reputation.) 
Given this structure, each agent i will have an incentive to take effort at date 
0 to persuade  other  agents  that his ability, which  they measure  as yi -  xt, is 
high. (Notice  that in equilibrium  the market is not fooled.  However,  this does 
not mean that the agent can slack; he still has to work hard so as not to convey 
a poor signal about his ability and lose his reputation.)  Moreover,  the extent 
to which agent i tries to persuade  others about his ability will depend  on how 
much  his bargaining  power  would  be  improved  by his  being  perceived  as 
being able; this in turn will depend  on (x, the allocation  of assets at date  1. A 
good control structure a  will encourage  agents to work hard at building  their 
reputations  in  order  to  alleviate  the  moral  hazard  problem  at date  0.  The 
propositions  and results from Sections  III and IV can be shown to apply; for 
details, see  Hart and  Moore  (1988,  sec. 5). 
Here  we are narrowly interpreting  xi as effort.  However,  we believe  that a 
suitably modified  model  would  admit broader  interpretations.  For example, 
xi could stand for a particular type  of action selected by the employee  (which of 
several tasks to carry out),  with the  idea being  that an agent  i may choose  a 
particular xi at date  0 (e.g.,  he  may carry out the task requested  by his boss) 
because he wants to signal that he is a particular type of worker (e.g., that he is 
obedient,  willing,  trustworthy,  or loyal). 
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